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DOES LOUISIANA REALLY HAVE STRICT LIABILITY UNDER
CIVIL CODE ARTICLES 2317, 2318, AND 2321?
Recently, within a span of thirteen months, the Louisiana
Supreme Court announced in three major cases' that owner-
custodians are liable for the damage caused by people or things in
their custody under a theory in the nature of "strict liability."'
Although this change in the law was dramatic, it was not a total sur-
prise.' Over ten years ago, Louisiana courts were urged to impose a
type of strict liability upon custodians of certain things.' The
justification for such a change is that, in today's crowded society, the
owner or custodian who keeps a thing for his pleasure or enjoyment,
thus creating a risk, should bear the loss caused by the thing in his
custody, rather than placing that burden on the innocent bystander
who is thereby injured.'
Although called strict liability, there are indications in the Loui-
siana jurisprudence that Louisiana courts will look to negligence
principles when they encounter problems with the new theory.' One
reason for the reference to negligence terminology is that, as will be
discussed subsequently, the language used by the supreme court in
Loescher v. Parr,7 the latest statement on the subject of owner-
custodian strict liability, may encourage courts to turn to negligence
1. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975); Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270
(La. 1975); Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974).
2. Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d at 119. In Loescher Justice Tate states that
this type of liability has been referred to as strict liability. 324 So. 2d at 447. See text
at notes 22-25, infra.
3. For a summary of the law in this area before 1974, see Note, The "Discovery"
of Article 2317, 37 LA. L. REV. 234 (1976); Note, Introducing Strict Liability to Article
2317, 22 Loy. L. REv. 625 (1976); Note, Strict Liaibility for Damage Caused by
Animals, 21 Loy. L. REV. 785 (1975); Note, Tort-Strict Liability for Damage Done by
Things in One's Possession, 51 TUL. L. REV. 403 (1977); Note, Tort-Damage Caused
by Animals-Louisiana Adopts Strict Liability, 49 TUL. L. REV. 719 (1975); Note,
Tort-Damage Caused by Minors Under the Age of Discretion-Strict Vicarious
Liability Imposed on Parents, 49 TUL. L. REV. 1194 (1975).
4. As early as 1965, then Judge Tate expressed the opinion that the owner of a
car should be strictly liable for damage caused by an accident due to brake failure.
Dore v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 180 So. 2d 434 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). See
also Simon v. Ford Motor Co., 282 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973); Theriot v. Transit Cas. Co.,
263 La. 106, 267 So. 2d 211 (1972); Cartwright v. Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J.,
213 So. 2d 154 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
5. Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d at 119-20.
6. In addition to using language similar to that used in negligence cases, the
courts seem willing to equate victim fault and contributory negligence. See Herbert v.
United Serv. Auto Assoc., 355 So. 2d 575 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 So. 2d
1002 (La. 1978); Parker v. Hanks, 345 So. 2d 194 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346
So. 2d 224 (La. 1977). See generally Comment, Fault of the Victim: Limits of Liability
under Civil Code Articles 2317, 2318 and 2321, 38 LA. L. REV. 995 (1978).
7. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
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principles. In fact, that language causes one to wonder whether
Louisiana really has strict liability under Civil Code articles 2317,
2318, and 2321. The following discussion is intended to aid the
reader in forming an opinion as to the true nature of Louisiana's
theory of strict liability.
Strict liability is not a recent development in the law of torts.
Under the laws of early England, a defendant was held strictly
liable if he injured the plaintiff by applying force directly against
him.' There was no need for the plaintiff to prove any type of fault
or moral blameworthiness on the part of the defendant.' This rule
governed in cases of intentional and unintentional harm.0 In the
seventeenth century it was first suggested that in instances of
unintentional harm a defendant would be absolved from liability if
he could prove that he was utterly without fault." Fault, in this con-
text, apparently meant intended harm or harm resulting from a lack
of due care on the part of the defendant.'2
Gradually, as society became more and more complex, courts
found it necessary to compromise between the various interests pres-
ent in society.'" For example, courts had to compromise between a
laborer's interest in safe working conditions and that of the public in
economic and industrial growth." The tool used in the effort to com-
promise among these interests was the principles of negligence
theory.'" By the end of the nineteenth century, fault had become a
major determinant in the imposition of liability for unintentional
harm.' The early twentieth century saw the negligence, ie., fault,
requirement becoming accepted as if it had never been questioned. 7
There remained, however, certain types of harm for which no show-
ing of fault on the part of the defendant was required.'8
8. This type of action was brought under a writ of trespass while an action for
damage caused by indirect force was brought under trespass on the case. Malone,
Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of the Common Law of Torts, 31 LA.
L. REV. 1 (1970).
9. Id at 11.
10. Id. at 12-13.
11. Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (1616).
12. Malone, supra note 8, at 17-18.
13. Id. at 40.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Malone, supra note 8, at 41.
17. Id.
18. Strict liability was often imposed where certain types of harm were greatly
feared. Thus, these harms were suppressed by the courts. In early England, fire was
one of the most feared hazards, justifying the imposition of strict liability for damage
caused by fire. Strict liability for harm done by escaping cattle is more difficult to
justify. Id. at 24-25.
[Vol. 40
COMMENTS
Most writers agree that negligence theory, as well as the theory
of strict liability, as a method of imposing liability, was based on
socio-economic policy considerations.19 Strict liability worked well
when most harms were intended and involved only two actors, the
plaintiff and the defendant. Negligence was used to compromise the
various interests emerging in an increasingly complex society. As
one writer has stated, "the conception of negligence or liability
upon a flexible standard of care is not likely to come into being until
society has reached a stage where diverse economic and social needs
have emerged and are in lively competition with each other."', To-
day, the pendulum may be swinging back toward the use of strict
liability as a major determinant of liability in many areas of tort
law."
Strict liability has been called liability without fault.' This
definition is more than adequate for most jurisdictions, but it
presents a problem in Louisiana. Jurisprudence construing Loui-
siana Civil Code article 2315 requires that there be no liability
without fault." As previously mentioned, the common law recognized
fault as negligence or intended, wrongful conduct. The civil law has
also defined fault in terms of wilful, unlawful conduct, as well as im-
prudence or want of skill."' Curiously enough, despite its prominent
role in determining liability in Louisiana, fault is not clearly defined
in the Louisiana Civil Code.2
5
There being no legislative definition of fault, courts in Louisiana
defined fault as negligent or intentional conduct which caused in-
jury. Then, after years of jurisprudence equating fault and
negligence,' the courts developed a definition of fault under which a
person could be held liable without being negligent, thus obtaining
the same result as that reached in other jurisdictions under the
19. See Fleming, The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 815
(1967); Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359
(1951); Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Fault in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L. REV.
225 (1971).
20. Malone, supra note 8, at 27.
21. Peck, supra note 19, at 225.
22. Id.
23. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 states in part: "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." See, e.g., Luke
v. Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co., 147 La. 30, 84 So. 483 (1920).
24. Moses v. Butts, 70 So. 2d 203 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954); Stone, Tort Doctrine in
Louisiana: The Concept of Fault, 27 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1952). See also LA. CIv. CODE arts.
2316 & 3556(13).
25. Stone, supra note 24, at 9; Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The Materials
for the Decision of a Case, 17 TUL. L. REV. 159, 187-88 (1942).
26. E.g., Samson v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 205 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1967); Lyons v. Jahncke Serv. Inc., 125 So. 2d 619 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
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theory of strict liability. This was accomplished in the case of
Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp.,27 in which former Justice Barham
stated that fault as used in article 2315 includes more than
negligence, in fact encompassing conduct for which one could be
held liable without being negligent." Thus, fault in Louisiana was
redefined to include both negligent and non-negligent conduct,
thereby clearing the way for the supreme court in Holland v.
Buckley,"9 Turner v. Bucher,° and Loescher v. Parr"1 to hold owner-
custodians liable for the damage caused by persons or things in
their custody, without requiring a plaintiff to prove that the owner-
custodian was negligent.
Loescher is the most important case of the three not only
because it is the latest of the cases chronologically, but also because
it summarizes Louisiana jurisprudential developments in this area,
including Holland and Turner.2 However, the language used by the
court in Loescher indicates that it may not represent as clean a
break with negligence concepts as some may think. The court in
Loescher clearly specified that before the owner-custodian of a per-
son or thing could be held strictly liable, the person or thing in the
defendant's custody must present an unreasonable risk of injury to
the plaintiff." The use of the phrase "unreasonable risk of injury"
could represent an introduction of negligence concepts into an area
of the law in which such concepts are presumably inapplicable.u In
order to determine whether Loescher embraces certain elements of
a negligence action, it is helpful to examine the way in which negli-
gence actions have been described in the Louisiana jurisprudence.
Negligence has been clearly described by Louisiana courts as
the creation, maintenance, or failure to guard against an
unreasonable risk of injury to another." Compare this description
with that used by the court in Loescher in speaking of liability
which is to be determined without regard to negligence, ie., strict
27. 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
28. 258 La. at 1084, 249 So. 2d at 140; Barham, A Renaissance of the Civilian
Tradition in Louisiana, 33 LA. L. REV. 357, 382 (1973).
29. 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974).
30. 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975).
31. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
32. Id. at 446.
33. Id. at 449.
34. Note, The "Discovery" of Article 2317, 37 LA. L. REV. 234, 240 (1976).
35. See, e.g., Pence v. Ketchum, 326 So. 2d 831 (La. 1976); Musso v. St. Mary
Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 345 So. 2d 129 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 347 So.




liability: "The fault of the person thus liable is based upon his
failure to prevent the person or thing for whom he is responsible
from causing such unreasonable risk of injury to others.""6 The
similarity in the language describing each action is evident. Under
both theories a person must be responsible in some way for an
unreasonable risk of harm before he can be held liable. In traditional
negligence theory, in order to determine the reasonableness of a
risk, a balancing test is performed 7 weighing the probability,
magnitude, and cost of preventing the risk against the social utility
of the conduct or thing causing the injury."
One of the best examples of this balancing test in Louisiana
jurisprudence is the case of Allien v. Louisiana Power & Light Co."
There, the plaintiffs husband was standing near a drilling mast and
was killed when the mast touched an electric line erected by the
defendants. Although the wire had been raised to a height which ex-
ceeded professional standards, the third circuit held that the defen-
dants were negligent."0 The court noted that the wire, though highly
charged, was uninsulated and had been placed in an area where
drilling masts were likely to touch it." Perhaps the most decisive
factors noted by the court were that the wire served no useful pur-
pose and could have been removed at minimal cost.
Given these stated factors, it can be seen that the court balanced
the probability, magnitude, and cost of preventing the risk created
by the erection of the line against the line's utility. The court used
this balancing test to determine whether the defendant was
negligent. It is interesting to note that the court defined negligence
as "conduct which creates an unreasonable risk of foreseeable
harm.""
36. 324 So. 2d at 446.
37. A classic example of the negligence balancing test is found in Judge Learned
Hand's opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). See
Chicago B. & Q.R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 91 N.W. 880 (1902), aff'd, 70 Neb.
766, 98 N.W. 44 (1904).
38. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). See also
Guilbeau v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 338 So. 2d 600 (La. 1976); Pence v. Ketchum, 326 So.
2d 831 (La. 1976); Helminger v. Cook Paint and Varnish Co., 230 So. 2d 623 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1970); Taylor v. National Indem. Co., 215 So. 2d 203 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). The
negligence balancing test is performed in order to determine what a reasonably pru-
dent man would have done under the circumstances. See Pitre v. Employers Liab.
Assurance Corp., 234 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 256 La. 617, 237 So.
2d 398 (1970).
39. 202 So. 2d 704 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 251 La. 392, 204 So. 2d 574
(1967).
40. Id. at 711.
41. Id. at 710.
42. This definition of negligence is the one generally used by authorities on the
subject. W. PROSSER. THE LAW OF TORTS § 31 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 282 (1965).
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There are no cases in Louisiana where a court has expressly used
a negligence balancing test approach in a Loescher-type strict liability
situation. However, courts in other jurisdictions applying another
form of strict liability have resorted to a balancing test when faced
with "reasonbleness" language similar to that used in Loescher. An
examination of why these courts have resorted to a balancing test
may prove useful in determining the extent to which, if any,
Loescher sanctions the use of a balancing test in the application of
strict liability.
Under section 402(A) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a
manufacturer is held strictly liable for the damage caused by his
product if that product is in a "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous.""3 The resemblance between this language and the
"unreasonable risk of injury" language of Loescher is obvious. It
was never intended that manufacturers be insurers of the safety of
their products," and it was thought that the phrase "unreasonably
dangerous" would prevent such a burden from being placed upon
manufacturers. For example, a distillery should not be held liable
for a consumer's ill health brought on by the prolonged excessive
consumption of whiskey. 5 Other examples include consumers who
are cut by sharp knives or hatchets while such items are being used
improperly.'
In spite of the laudatory purpose of the "unreasonably
dangerous" requirement, courts have had difficulty using the phrase
in a strict liability context. There are two major problems that have
arisen in applying section 402(A). The first problem encountered by
the courts has been the difficulty of determining whether a plaintiff
must prove both that the product causing the injury is defective and
that the product is unreasonably dangerous, or whether proof by the
43. Section 402(A) states: "One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his prop-
erty ...." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965).
44. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
45. Comment (i) to section 402(A) states:
Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some
people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, contain-
ing a dangerous amount of fuse] oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacco is
not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harm-
ful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably
dangerous. Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely because, if such be
the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A), comment (i) (1965).




plaintiff that a product is unreasonably dangerous is sufficient in
itself to make the product per se defective."
At least one court viewing the Restatement as requiring a bifur-
cated test of strict liability has eliminated the unreasonably
dangerous language from its law of products liability.'8 The reason
given is that the unreasonably dangerous requirement places upon
the plaintiff the burden of proving negligence on the part of the
defendant, a burden which the introduction of strict liability
presumably lifted.'9
Other courts retaining the unreasonably dangerous requirement
interpret the phrases "defective condition" and "unreasonably
dangerous" as synonymous." However, these courts have used two
methods which strongly resemble the negligence-type balancing
tests in determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous.
One method for determining unreasonable danger is suggested by
the Restatement comments." This method is commonly referred to
as the consumer expectation test. Under this test, a product is
unreasonably dangerous if the risk of injury exceeds that con-
templated by an ordinary and reasonable consumer.2 Notice that
this ordinary reasonable consumer closely resembles the reasonably
prudent man of the negligence cases." A variant of the consumer ex-
pectation test focuses on the actions of the manufacturer. This
manufacturer test even more closely resembles negligence deter-
mination criteria. This test states that a product is unreasonably
47. Wade, supra note 44, at 14-15.
48. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972). In those jurisdictions which view the Restatement as requiring a bifurcated test
and which have, therefore, retained the unreasonably dangerous requirement, it is dif-
ficult to determine just how the requirement is being used. See Mather v. Caterpillar
Tractor Corp., 23 Ariz. App. 409, 533 P.2d 717 (1975); Kleve v. General Motors Corp.,
210 N.W.2d 568 (Iowa 1973).
49. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr.
at 442.
50. E.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1272 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1096 (1974); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1087 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
51. Comment (i) to section 402(A) states: "The article sold must be dangerous to
an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A), Comment (i) (1965).
52. This test has been criticized by some writers. See, e.g., Fischer, Products
Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339 (1974); Keeton, Manufacturer's
Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20
SYRACUSE L. REV. 559 (1969).
53. See note 38, supra.
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dangerous when a reasonable manufacturer would not sell the pro-
duct if he knew of the risk involved."
One can easily see the similarity between the manufacturer test
and a negligence determination. In fact, at least one writer has
stated the manufacturer test as follows: "Thus, assuming that the
defendant had knowledge of the condition of the product, would he
then have been acting unreasonably in placing it on the market?"'6 5
Consider also how the test for strict liability tracks the balancing
test utilized in negligence theory: "Proof of unreasonableness in-
volves a balancing process. On one side of the scale is the utility of
the product and on the other side is the risk of its use."58
The second difficulty faced by courts applying Restatement sec-
tion 402(A) is how to define defective condition or defect. Of course,
those jurisdictions which find a defective condition to be equivalent
to an unreasonably dangerous one are not faced with this problem
since a defect is defined as any flaw in a product which makes the
product unreasonably dangerous." However, those courts which
read the Restatement as requiring a bifurcated test are still faced
with the dilemma of defining the term "defect." Even those jurisdic-
tions that have ignored the unreasonably dangerous requirement of
the Restatement are left with the task of determining whether the
product in question is defective. Once the determination that the
product is defective is made, then the defendant is liable. However,
these courts have failed to develop a suitable definition of defect."
Although the analogy between strict products liability and the
54. E.g., Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1973); Olsen v.
Royal Metals Corp., 392 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1968).
55. Wade, supra note 44, at 15.
56. Aller v. Rodgers Machinery Mfg. Co. Inc., 268 N.W.2d 830, 835 (Iowa 1978).
See also Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1978). Some courts, as in
Aller, although recognizing the similarity of the two actions, have maintained that
they are in fact different. See Barker v. Lull Eng. Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d
443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). At least one commentator has stated that the tests are
the same except for the element of scienter. Wade, supra note 44, at 15. See generally
Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973);
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MIss. L.J. 825 (1973);
Note, Torts-Products Liability-Theory of Strict Tort Liability Under Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A Held Applicable in Maryland When Complaint Alleged That
Defendant Manufactured and Placed on the Market an Automobile in a Defective Con-
dition Not Reasonably Safe for its Intended Use, 6 U. BALT. L. REV. 295 (1977). The
distinction between the tests for negligence and strict products liability is especially
hard to define in design cases. See Garrison v. Rohm & Haas Co., 492 F.2d 346 (6th
Cir. 1974); Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975), rev'd,
278 Md. 304, 363 A.2d 460 (1976).
57. See note 50, supra.
58. Fischer, supra note 52, at 341. But see Barker v. Lull Eng. Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d
413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
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Loescher-type strict liability is not perfect, it cannot be dismissed
lightly. It can be expected that the Louisiana courts applying strict
liability under Loescher will face many of the same problems faced
by courts applying strict products liability. Since negligence theory
in the form of a balancing test has found its way into strict products
liability law through the phrase "unreasonably dangerous," it is fairly
safe to assume that the same thing will happen in the area of strict
liability for damage caused by things in one's possession through the
phrase "unreasonable risk of injury," as introduced by Loescher.
If indeed Louisiana courts are using a balancing test to deter-
mine whether a thing in one's possession presents an unreasonable
risk of injury to another, they are not doing so expressly. This is not
surprising since Loescher gives very little guidance to courts as to
the purpose of the unreasonable risk requirement or as to its use.
One recent case points out what alternatives are open to the
courts. In Greene v. Catalytic Inc.,9 the plaintiff was injured when
he tripped over an airhose in a maintenance shop owned by the cor-
poration. At the time of the injury, the defendant was using the
hose. The hose ran across a space which was not a regular
passageway but was instead an opening between pieces of equip-
ment. The plaintiff alleged negligence and strict liability. Concerning
the strict liability action the court said: "[Tlhe conduct of [the defen-
dant] cannot be said to create an unreasonable risk of harm. While
some risk may be created by an airhose on a shop floor, it is not an
unreasonable risk and so there is no strict liability in this
instance.""
According to Loescher a plaintiff need only prove "the vice (i.e.,
unreasonable risk of injury to another) in the person or thing whose
act causes the damage, and that the damage resulted from this
vice."" Once this is proved, the defendant can escape liability only
by a showing of fault of the victim, fault of a third person, or causa-
tion by a fortuitous event."2 Thus, although the language of Loescher
indicates that "vice" is equivalent to the creation of an unreasonable
risk, and therefore no physical imperfection in the thing causing in-
jury is needed to impose liability, the facts of Loescher reveal that
indeed a physical imperfection was present in the thing causing the
injury. This may lead to the assumption that, in order for a plaintiff
to recover, he must show that the thing contained a physical im-
perfection and also that the defective thing presented an
59. 341 So. 2d 1172 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 344 So. 2d 4 (La. 1977).
60. Id at 1173.
61. 324 So. 2d at 446-47.
62. Id, at 447.
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unreasonable risk of injury to the defendant. Thus, although in
Greene the court ruled that there was no unreasonable risk of in-
jury, one might query whether the court really meant that the hose
had no physical imperfection, and therefore strict liability did not
apply. If the hose had been stretched across an often-used aisle,
would the court have concluded that the hose was defective? If
strict liability was applicable in Greene, what boundaries are there
to prevent unlimited liability? These questions point out some of the
problems that courts must face given the language of Loescher, prob-
lems which are analogous to those faced by courts applying section
402(A) in the products liability area. Thus, the experience of these
courts may offer some guidance to Louisiana courts.
Louisiana courts could interpret Loescher as requiring proof of a
vice or defect as well as proof that the defective thing presents an
unreasonable risk of injury. The problems that will be encountered
if this interpretation is chosen can be compared to those faced by
courts which interpret Restatement section 402(A) to require proof
of a defective condition which is unreasonably dangerous. Those
courts which give a literal interpretation to the Restatement have
had difficulty determining when a product is unreasonably
dangerous without using a negligence-type balancing test. Similarly,
Louisiana courts adopting this interpretation of Loescher can also
be expected to utilize a negligence-type balancing test to determine
whether the risk created by a thing in one's custody is
unreasonable. The courts could, as was done in the products liability
area in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.," ignore the unreasonableness
language of Loescher, applying only the requirement of a defect.
But, in this situation, as in Cronin, courts are left with the for-
midable task of defining the term "defect".
The word "defect," in light of Loescher, could be defined as a
physical imperfection in a thing causing injury."4 This definition
works well in situations involving inanimate objects, but it seems in-
appropriate to refer to animals as having a defect and particularly
inappropriate to refer to children as being defective. However,
Turner does speak of children as sometimes engaging in deficient
conduct. According to Turner, read in light of the language in
Loescher, the conduct of a six-year-old child who rides a bicycle on a
sidewalk where pedestrians are present is, for the purposes of strict
63. 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153, 8 Cal. 3d 121 (1972).
64. Generally, a defect is thought of as a physical imperfection in a thing such as a
dented fender or crooked bumper on a car. These physical imperfections are generally
referred to as manufacturing defects. However, a product may be defective and still be
manufactured properly. This kind of defect is called a design defect which results from
a lack of planning or testing on the part of the designer.
[Vol. 40
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liability, deficient conduct. However, the court does not explain how
it reached the conclusion that the conduct in question was deficient.
It is submitted that Louisiana courts after the Loescher decision
will have to use some type of reasonableness standard in determin-
ing whether the conduct of a child is deficient; moreover, whether or
not this conduct is deficient will depend upon the outcome of a
balancing test by which the utility of the conduct is weighed against
the risks involved.
6 5
Instead of reading Loescher as mandating a bifurcated test re-
quiring a finding of defect plus unreasonable risk of injury, courts
could interpret this decision as imposing only a burden of proof of
unreasonable risk of injury." This would be analogous to the ap-
proach taken by those courts who read the defective condition re-
quirement of Restatement section 402(A) as synonymous with the
creation of an unreasonably dangerous risk. 7 This approach would
resolve the problem of defining the term defect in one way when the
definition is applied to things and another way when applied to
children. Thus, the owner-custodian would be held liable whenever a
thing or a child in his custody presented an unreasonable risk of in-
jury to another which materializes to cause damage. However, in
this approach a balancing test is once again required in order to
determine whether the risk created is unreasonable.
The difference resulting from a choice between these two alter-
natives can be illustrated by a number of factual situations involving
damage caused by things in one's custody. In situation number one,
assume that a police bloodhound runs into a backwoods hiker and
breaks his arm while the hound is hot on the trail of an escaped
felon. For situation number two, assume that the friend of a small
child is seriously injured while the two are playing. The uninjured
child is unable to use the streets to go for help because of congested
traffic. Instead, the uninjured child rides his bicycle on the sidewalk
where pedestrians are walking. In his haste, the child strikes an
elderly woman and injures her. Finally, in situation number three,
assume that a piece of medical equipment which is used in an at-
65. "Is there a parallel between the word 'negligence' as applied to action and the
word 'defect' as applied to things?" A. VON MEHREN, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM-AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 622 (2d ed. 1977).
66. In Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1978), Justice Dixon, in
describing an action brought under Loescher, did not mention the requirement of a
defect. Id. at 1335. This could be seen'as an implication that any object or person that
presents an unreasonable risk of injury is deficient or defective, thus making the two
concepts synonymous.
67. See cases cited at note 50, supra.
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tempt to save a patient's life malfunctions and causes injury to the
patient.
These situations are similar in that, in each case, the utility of
the object or conduct causing the injury has been increased to a
point which arguably offsets the probability and magnitude of the
risk of injury. If the plaintiffs are required to prove the existence of
a defect plus unreasonable risk, then none of the plaintiffs should
recover because in each instance, the risk created by the conduct or
thing causing injury was reasonable. The plaintiff patient could easily
prove that the machine which caused injury was defective, but the
reasonableness of the risk will probably prevent recovery, assuming
there are no grounds for recovery other than Loescher-type strict
liability. In the situations involving the child and the dog, proving a
defect will be difficult because there is no physical imperfection.
With respect to a child, determining whether his conduct is deficient
will depend upon how his conduct measures up to a given standard,
which may well be functionally equivalent to saying that whether
his conduct was deficient depends upon whether the child was
negligent."8 Eliminating the unreasonable risk requirement would
aid the plaintiff patient who can prove the existence of a defect and
does not need to prove the presence of an unreasonable risk.
However, as shown above, removing the unreasonableness-of-the-
risk requirement as to children will do little to keep this type of
strict liability completely free of negligence concepts.
If the plaintiff need only prove that the thing causing the injury
presented an unreasonable risk, then the difficulty of ascertaining a
definition of defect which can be consistently applied to both things
and children is resolved. Notice, however, that a balancing test is
still required in order to determine whether the risk was
unreasonable. In all three of the hypotheticals mentioned, the plain-
tiff would be denied recovery since, in each case, the risk which
caused the injury was reasonable.
Neither Holland nor Turner contains the phrase "unreasonable
risk of injury." The language of those cases gives the court very little
escape in strict liability cases. Although the Holland court pointed
out that it did not intend to introduce absolute liability in dog-bite
cases,e9 Holland and Turner, absent a consideration of Loescher,
come very close to holding owner-custodians liable for all harm caused
by things in their custody. The unreasonable risk of injury language
of Loescher seems to be an attempt by the supreme court to inject a
68. See note 65, supra.
69. 305 So. 2d at 119, n.10.
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limitation, thereby relieving owner-custodians from being held ab-
solutely liable for all harm caused by things in their custody." Thus,
the Louisiana appellate courts should not disregard the
unreasonable risk language in Loescher as some other jurisdictions
have done in the products liability area.
Holland and Turner could be taken as indications that, in the
three hypotheticals previously mentioned, the police department,
the parent, and the hospital should all be liable as owner-custodians
of things which have caused injury. Loescher, however, indicates
that there are certain activities which should be engaged in even if
they carry a high risk of injury. Thus, Loescher seems to allow
courts to weigh the social utility of the thing or activity which
causes the harm and absolve the custodian of liability if the social
utility is great enough. For the sake of uniformity, Loescher should
be read as defining "defect" as any condition of a thing which
presents an unreasonable risk of injury to another. The owner-
custodian should be held liable whenever a thing or child in his
custody creates an unreasonable risk of injury to another which
materializes to cause injury.
If indeed this is the meaning of Loescher, inevitably the inquiry
becomes: does Louisiana really have strict liability under articles
2317, 2318 and 2321? In answering this question, it must be
remembered that the major difference between an action in strict
liability and an action in negligence is evidentiary. Basically, strict
liability prevents a defendant from defeating a plaintiffs claim by
alleging that he did what a reasonable man would have done under
the circumstances. In negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of prov-
ing that the defendant acted unreasonably in not preventing the risk
which caused the injury. In strict liability, the plaintiff need not
prove that the defendant acted unreasonably, but that the defendant
failed to prevent an unreasonable risk of injury. The focus then is
not on the actions of the defendant, but on the risk created by the
thing causing the injury.
To the extent that Loescher prevents a defendant from alleging
due care in response to a plaintiffs action, Louisiana does have
strict liability under articles 2317, 2318 and 2321. However, to the
70. Justice Tate, as author of one of the most important products liability cases in
Louisiana jurisprudence, Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 259 La. 599, 250
So. 2d 754 (1971), was no doubt aware of the strict-liability-for-products language of
section 402(A). Thus, Loescher presented the court with an opportunity to prevent
owner-custodians from becoming insurers of the safety of things in their possession
just as the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement of the Restatement was meant to
prevent manufacturers from becoming insurers of their products.
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extent that Loescher requires a determination that the risk created
by the thing is unreasonable, thus forcing the court to balance the
utility of the thing causing the injury against the magnitude and
probability of the risk created by it, a part of negligence theory is
still alive in this area. The true meaning of Loescher can be il-
luminated only by the supreme court, for only then can the policy
behind Louisiana's strict liability for damage caused by things in
one's custody be fully understood and acted upon by the courts. 1
Samuel N. Poole, Jr.
71. Even the supreme court has shown some uncertainty as to Loescher's scope of
application. It does not appear that Loescher will be applied, without some modifica-
tions, to escaped cattle. See, e.g., Harrington v. Upchurch, 331 So. 2d 506 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 337 So. 2d 222 (La. 1976). In Harrington, the supreme court denied
writs, indicating that the result was correct, after the owner of stray cattle was found
not liable. Justice Dixon's response to the denial of writs was, "If we are to have 'cow
law' different from 'dog law', we should more adequately explain it." 337 So. 2d at 222
(Dixon, J., dissenting).
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